Published September 19, 2026
Why GPS Tracking & Law Intersection Matters
The proliferation of consumer GPS devices, location-sharing apps, Bluetooth trackers, and connected vehicles has made real-time monitoring of another person’s movements a low-cost, low-skill activity. A phone, a location-sharing app, a shared cloud account, a Bluetooth tag, or a GPS tracker can each accomplish the task within minutes. That accessibility has direct consequences for intimate partner abuse. The CDC’s most recent national survey data shows why legislatures have taken an interest: among stalking victims, 15.6% of women and 29.3% of men reported being tracked through GPS or similar location technology they never approved, according to the NISVS 2023/2024 Stalking Data Brief published in September 2025. Where intimate partner stalking technology is concerned, the legal framework draws on overlapping layers of constitutional doctrine, federal statute, and state criminal law, none of which were originally drafted with consumer-grade tracking in mind. Understanding how GPS tracking law and location data surveillance intersect with coercive control requires tracing those layers.
The Constitutional Baseline: Jones and Carpenter
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions form the constitutional backdrop for GPS tracking law, even though both arose in law enforcement contexts rather than domestic violence cases.
In January 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously confirmed in United States v. Jones that Americans have constitutional protections against GPS surveillance by law enforcement, holding that GPS tracking is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In the case, Washington, D.C. officers suspected the defendant was a drug dealer, obtained a warrant to install a GPS device on a vehicle, but did not complete the installation until after the warrant’s authorized timeframe had expired, then tracked the defendant for 28 days. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, rested on a trespass theory. In his concurrence, Justice Alito criticized this framing, arguing that what mattered was not the trivial physical trespass of attaching a small device but the prolonged nature of the surveillance itself.
Six years later, in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the Court extended Fourth Amendment protection to historical cell-site location information held by wireless carriers. The Court ruled in a 5 to 4 decision that the government needs a warrant to access a person’s cellphone location history, finding that obtaining such information is a search under the Fourth Amendment. The majority observed that time-stamped location data “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”
Although both Jones and Carpenter govern state action, their reasoning resonates in intimate partner stalking technology cases because it affirms that prolonged location tracking implicates core privacy interests. Courts and legislatures crafting domestic violence protections now operate against a constitutional backdrop that treats location data as inherently sensitive.
Federal Statutory Framework
At the federal level, 18 U.S.C. Section 2261A addresses stalking. As part of the 1996 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Congress added an anti-stalking law to bolster victim protections and address legal gaps. Under Section 2261A, it is a federal crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or to use electronic communication, “with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person.” The phrase “place under surveillance” is significant: it captures GPS monitoring and location data surveillance without requiring a physical threat.
A separate gap has drawn attention from advocacy organizations. As the National Network to End Domestic Violence noted in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, while the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) requires user consent before a company shares the contents of a user’s communications, the law allows a commercial entity to share a user’s location information without consent. Many location-tracking applications that capture and disclose location alone would not violate ECPA, since ECPA does not cover location interception by itself. That gap means intimate partner stalking technology that harvests only location data may evade one of the primary federal electronic surveillance statutes.
State-Level Approaches
State legislatures have developed varied responses. Some states’ stalking laws specifically prohibit placing a tracking device on a person’s property, such as a car or purse, without consent. State codes govern the tracker itself, while federal statutes govern communications, interstate conduct, and civil damages. The statutes fall into roughly three groups: some prohibit locating a person outright, some tie the offense to installing a device on a vehicle without the owner’s or lessee’s agreement, and others reach tracking through general stalking or harassment provisions.
Connecticut provides one illustration. Under C.G.S. Section 53a-181f, a person commits electronic stalking when, with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, they use any interactive computer service, electronic communication service, or electronic monitoring system to place another person under surveillance or engage in a course of conduct that puts that person (or their immediate family member or intimate partner) in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.
However, as WomensLaw.org notes, electronic surveillance laws such as computer crimes or privacy laws are not specifically focused on domestic violence, so police or attorneys may not think of them right away. This observation highlights an enforcement gap: even where statutes cover GPS tracking, practitioners in the field may not connect those tools to domestic violence cases.
Connected Vehicles as a Newer Frontier
The rise of internet-connected automobiles has opened a new vector for location data surveillance. Domestic abuse survivors have described scenarios in which a restraining order and court-granted possession of a family car were not enough to stop an abusive former partner from tracking the vehicle. Abusive partners increasingly use technology to exercise control, monitor, and continue to abuse their victims.
California responded with SB 1394, authored by Senator Dave Min. The bill was approved by Governor Newsom and filed with the Secretary of State on September 27, 2024. The new law requires car manufacturers to disable an abuser’s access to remote vehicle technology within two business days of a victim’s request, with proper documentation. SB 1394 takes effect in stages, with the first portion effective on July 1, 2025 and the final portion relating to new automobile requirements taking effect on January 1, 2028. The bill was crafted with input from dozens of survivors who experienced abuse due to remote access or location tracking, according to Professor Jane Stoever, director of the University of California, Irvine Law School Domestic Violence Clinic. The law is, however, unable to address the rise of independent location tracking devices, such as Apple AirTags, which are widely reported as tools used to stalk domestic violence victims.
At the federal regulatory level, the FCC announced in April 2024 that it is exploring how existing law can hold automakers and wireless service providers accountable for ensuring domestic violence survivors who drive connected cars cannot be harassed by abusers, and a formal proceeding is examining whether FCC rules changes are needed.
Enduring Analytical Questions
Several structural tensions run through this area. First, the consent framework that governs most GPS tracking law presumes clear boundaries between authorized and unauthorized access, yet shared accounts, family phone plans, and jointly owned vehicles blur those boundaries in intimate relationships. Courts generally hold that intimate relationships do not grant automatic permission to monitor someone’s location, messages, or online activity without consent, but proving the absence of consent in the context of coercion remains a challenge.
Second, the federal statutory landscape was not designed for the era of pervasive location data surveillance. ECPA’s gap regarding location-only data, combined with the interstate-travel requirement under Section 2261A, means that purely intrastate GPS monitoring by a private individual may fall outside federal reach entirely, leaving enforcement to the patchwork of state codes.
Third, technology continues to outpace law. Connected vehicles, Bluetooth trackers, and commercial data brokers each present distinct regulatory challenges. Legislation such as California’s SB 1394 addresses one device category at a time, leaving gaps that new products may exploit.
Credible Resources for Further Information
Individuals seeking further information about technology-facilitated abuse may consult the Safety Net project at the National Network to End Domestic Violence, which provides resources on technology, privacy, and safety planning, or WomensLaw.org, which offers plain-language legal information on stalking, electronic surveillance, and protective orders across U.S. jurisdictions. The National Domestic Violence Hotline (1-800-799-7233) connects callers with local service providers. This article is educational content and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), Cornell Law Institute
- 18 U.S.C. Section 2261A, WomensLaw.org
- SB 1394, Access to Connected Vehicle Service, California Legislature
- GPS Monitoring and Domestic Violence Laws, WomensLaw.org
- National Network to End Domestic Violence, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony (June 2014)
- Car Tracking and Domestic Abuse, The Markup (April 2024)
Disclaimer
Coercive control law moves fast. Jurisdictions are actively criminalizing it, amending definitions, and changing the scope of litigation. This article is current as of its date of publication and may not reflect subsequent changes. It is provided for general educational purposes and is not legal advice.